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Under the Gaze of Double Critique: De-colonisation, 
De-sacralisation and the Orphan Book 
 
Joshua Sabih 
 
 
Abstract 
Instead of the orientalist reformist paradigm as frame and 
episteme, Khatibi proposes a theory of double critique, critical 
liminality that targets, in a bi-directional movement, a 
Eurocentric or Orientalist discourse and an ethnocentric local 
discourse. Three critical concepts, constitutive of the theory of 
double critique: decolonisation, desacralisation and the orphan 
book are operative in Khatibi´s analysis of Orientalism, identity, 
and the issue of origin. As a professional outsider, Khatibi 
follows conceptually and methodologically the rules of the 
epistemological critique in an enunciation of negotiation, not of 
negation; a site of hybridity. 
 
This limited knowledge will allow me perhaps to add that the 
founding of the Muḥammadan religion seems to me to be an 
abbreviated repetition of the Jewish one, in imitation of which it 
made its appearance. (Freud, 1967:177). 
  
In a word, it can be said that Islam is an empty place in the 
theory of psychoanalysis. (Khatibi, (2002:237)1 
  
Toute religion, toute culture, toute communauté de mémoire ou 
de langue ne peut être Soi à son commencement, ne peut venir à 
Soi avant d'avoir fait l´épreuve de l'autre et de l´Étranger. 
(Benslama, 2002:31) 
 
 
Curse of affiliation: hermeneutical conflict 
  
The question of how does and/or should2 a native Muslim intellectual 
(muṯaqqaf), thinker (mufakkir) and religious scholar (ʿālim/faqīh)3 
                                               
1 As indicated by Khatibi himself this article appeared for the first time in the 
journal Les Temps Modernes, in October 1977 under the title “Le Maghreb 
comme horizon de pensée”, and re-edited later in his book Maghreb Pluriel in 
1983. I should also indicate that all translations into English are mine.  
2 “Does” and “should” are two modes of action. While the first is an action-
as-process, the second is action-as-deontology.        
3 Terms “intellectual” (muṯaqqaf), “thinker” (mufakkir) and “religious 
scholar” (ʿālim/ faqīh) are three heterogeneous - though interdependent 
categories of the post-Nahda thought. These categories are framed within a 
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approach islam4 and the Qur’ān - a foundational text of Islamic 
religion and Arab-Islamic civilisation - touches upon what I call here 
the curse of affiliation (origin) of the thinking subject in its relation to 
the object of study: Islamic Studies, and how one should “evaluate” 
and “categorise” what they say about this object of study, i.e., how we 
today should/ought approach this vast domain of utterances/discourses 
- knowing very well the intricacies of the task at hand - that these 
three categories and agents produce on their proper cultural heritage 
(turāṯ). In other words, the way this issue has been articulated since 
the beginning of the Arab Nahda in the second half of the 19th 
                                                                                            
complex network of relationships that are structured locally and 
transnationally.      
4 The position taken in this article is that the term islam is written with a 
lowercase (i). However, I will not alter the orthography of the term Islam in 
quoted references. This is not a grammatical mistake, but purposefully a 
deconstruction of the grammaticalised - canonised - essentialisation of the 
orthodox representation of islam, (the Islam, the One, the Arabic, etc.). On 
this point, see my discussion of Khatibi on the orphan book in this article. The 
use of critical language by the critical discourse begins in how we trans-scribe 
this representation - as embedded trans-lation - into a hybrid site, a site of 
negotiation, not of negation (Bhabha 2004). Cf. my unpublished paper 
“Transcription as an embedded translation: Arabic & French in Driss 
Chraibi's Novels, in Second Writers´ and Literary Translators´ International 
Congress, WALTIC 2010 Congress, Turkey, and my upcoming book together 
with a student of mine, Jacob Knak Christensen, a promising scholar in 
Judaeo-Arabic Studies, Transliteration as embedded translation: the Jew, the 
Arab in Hybrid Arabic (2016). Khatibi speaks about “the possibility of re-
questioning everything in islam...The islam of the Indonesian, the islam of the 
Sudanese and the islam of the Moroccan are not the same. There is a rift in 
the unity of language and believes: The Qur’ān is not the sole paradigm that 
structures the imaginary and thought (by the Arabic language), and at the 
same time structures society and the Islamic polis.  There is a rift. A rift 
which is perhaps striking in the case of Indonesia, Malaysia...There is a 
scission between the founding myth in the Qur’ānic text - a myth that is 
hardly known - and the founding myths of people’s mythologies - Indonesian, 
Malay.” (Khatibi 2002:433).  The impossibility of origin is due to the fact that 
origin is not palimpsestuous, which presupposes an origin (hyper-) and copies 
(hypo-), but translational (Bloom, 1973; Genette, 1982). Binary origin/copy 
expresses the hegemonic of the Arab/Arabic in its relation to the non-
Arab/Arabic. The same applies to the binary jāhiliya / islam. The latter is 
conceived in the mythic account of origin as a negation of the former. This 
negation is emulated / copied / mimicked in the fundamentalist discourse as a 
prerequisite of the true faith. There is however, a crisis of naming in Western 
and Islamic research traditions with regard to this study-object that is called 
Islam/islam. Crisis of naming - a paradox of an irreducible Islam (theology of 
the One) and a plural islam (islams) - that still inhabits the descriptive 
language of what Benslama calls “war of subjectivities”.  I see in Bergo and 
Smith´s re-use of Cohen and Zagury-Orly´s French term judéités in the 
English translation “Judeities: Questions for Jacques Derrida” an attempt to 
solve the tension between the terms: judaism, jewishness etc. On this issue see 
Derrida´s input with regard to Yerushalmi´s discussion of the two terms 
judaism, jewishness. (Derrida and Pernowitz, 1995; Bergo, Zagury-Orly & 
Cohen, 2007; Derrida, 2014) I must admit that addressing this issue should be 
a priority for modern critical thought! Beginning with introducing neologisms 
islam, islams, we should be consistent in our use of them in the manner of 
Khatibi´s double critique. (Cf. Azameh, 1993; Benslama, 2002) 
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century - despite how odd this may sound - is an orientalist issue 
which has, paradoxically, been mimetically internalized - and since 
then reiterated- by essentialist Muslims themselves, and to which, 
inevitably, critical thought (al-fikr al-naqdī) of all ideological 
affiliations have to relate: two types of affiliations/genealogies- 
mutually exclusive - are sustained: faith/tradition versus 
scientificity/modernity5. Arkoun (1985:95) has rightly noticed that in 
most of Muslims’ reactions, polemical in character, to Orientalism 
there is one given presumption: “the affiliation of the Muslim 
community confers a particular epistemological validity to which non-
Muslims have no access with regard to all discourses on Islam as 
religion, culture and history.”  
As we shall see later, it is quite common that both essentialist 
discourses, Islamic (whether religious or nationalist) and orientalist6, 
harbour a feeling of suspicion towards native Muslim researchers 
whose critical discourse follows the rules of the epistemological 
criticism; the latter group is simply disqualified. They are considered 
as neither western nor orientals7. (Gunther, 2013, Arkoun, 2007)  
Actually, the critical discourse - a hybrid site - of contemporary 
“native Muslim intellectuals8 - dare, in one simultaneous double act, 
to break away a) from being merely an orientalist objectified subject, 
lacking any scientific (critical) language, “native informant” (Spivak 
1999), and b) from what Arkoun calls dogmatic enclosure (Arkoun 
2007). Breaking away should be understood as a process. That is 
being in the process of breaking away. Instantaneous breaks, 
however, make everything fall into the abyss.  
                                               
5 The issue of how this issue was posed in the formative and classical periods 
of islam is beyond the scope of this article. The thing that the reader should 
retain here is that Arab-Islamic literature attests to the figure and profession of 
the intellectual - independent and critical one in particular. Besides, Qurʾānic 
archive has preserved the views of Arabs: Christians, Jews, Hanifs, and 
Pagans etc.- who contested Muḥammad´s prophethood on various important 
points - are actually recorded. On the notion of “intellectual” in the Middle 
Ages see (Le Goff, 1993; Urvoy, 1996)   
6 The term ”orientalist” used in this article refers to western discourse(s) about 
the orient: Body of knowledge, epistemology, ideology, worldview etc. 
7 In another context, Derrida re-asks the question that J. H. Yerushalmi asks in 
his book Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable: “Professor Freud, at 
this point I find it futile to ask whether, genetically or structurally, 
psychoanalysis is really a Jewish science; that we shall know, if it is at all 
knowable, only when much future work has been done. Much will depend, of 
course, on how the very terms Jewish and science are to be defined.”(Quoted 
in Derrida and Prenowitz, 1995:28). Is psychoanalysis a Jewish science? 
Khatibi takes his cue from this very question in his article that I am 
presenting/discussing in this paper: “Frontiers: Between Psychoanalysis and 
islam”. [Emphasis is mine] 
8 For the sake of simplicity, I shall use the terms intellectual and thinker 
interchangeably, and in opposition to the religious scholar, whom I call cleric. 
When I add the qualifier critical to the terms intellectual and thinker, I refer to 
a category of post-modernist/postcolonial thought that challenges the very 
notion of affiliation - or what Freud calls “ family romance”.      
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Before attending to Khatibi's critical discourse on French orientalism 
and exercising psychoanalysis as frontierial9 position in the language 
and exercise of a profession, I would like to visit- as a frontierial 
scholar myself 10- this seems-to-be-forever-debated issue: this 
seemingly inescapable curse of affiliation - palimpsestuous text: 
origin and its duplications - that critical “native Muslim” intellectuals, 
whom both foundational metaphysics and politics of identity have 
condemned them to, have tried to debunk; the irreducible essence of 
islam as absolute-other . In general terms - knowing too well how 
dangerous and slippery this can be and lead to - any critical 
intellectual (Muslim genealogy: the racial, ethnic and the religious are 
amalgamated)  - is construed/imagined as absolute-other trapped in 
Sisyphean state. In this optic, any act of decolonisation and 
desacralisation that critical thinkers like Khatibi11 - as one of these 
rare theoreticians and practitioner of critique double - are engaged in 
is seen as a meaningless act of repetition and borrowing: hence the 
notion of islamicising foreign knowledge.12 Nothing new under the 
sun says the biblical Solomon!  The gatekeepers of both Western 
scholars on islam in the name of science and objectivity, and Muslim 
clerics in the name of orthodoxy brand as a unscientific/heretic any 
critical  (discourse) about any (Islamic topic) that trespasses the 
                                               
9 I have chosen to render the French adjective frontalier by frontierial - not 
frontier-like, or boundary - because the last terms do not do justice to the 
meaning of the French term: “Qui habite une région voisine d´une frontière, 
et, en particulier, qui va travailler chaque jour au-delà de cette frontière.” (“A 
person who lives in a region neighbouring a border, and, in particular, 
someone who crosses that border every day to go to work”) Larousse. A 
frontierial critique is understood as double critique in the sense of critical 
liminality. See Raja Rhouni´s use of Khatibi´s double critique as critical 
liminality in her analysis of the Work of Fatima Mernissi. (Rhouni, 2010)    
10 On this autobiographical note, I would like to draw the attention of the 
reader that I too bear the mark of this curse of affiliation(s) in my body (-ies), 
my tongue(s), and my trans-disciplinary profession. It is not strange that my 
take on problems and issues of Orientalism, post-colonial and critical thinking 
is reflexive. It breaks away – as I identify myself with the stance that reflexive 
thinkers take on - with traditional thought. (cf. Khatibi, 2002)     
11 Abdelkébir al-Khatibi (Khatibi 1938-2009) is a prolific Moroccan thinker, 
philosopher sociologist, poet, novelist and activist. He has studied sociology 
at the University of Sorbonne in Paris. He earned his doctorate in 1968. 
Although he wrote almost exclusively in French, he was well versed in 
Arabic. Regarding his bibliography see for instance his Oeuvres complètes in 
three volumes: vol.1: novels, vol.2: poetry, vol.3: essays, which were 
published in 2008. He was of course one of the leading Arab trans-
lational/trans-national thinkers who worked on various fronts: the political, 
the cultural, the academic, the literary, the social etc. Already in 1968, Khatibi 
was engaged in the postcolonial debate that Marxist intellectuals inaugurated 
in the movement around the journal Souffles. Cf. Sefrioui 2013, Bonn 1999)   
12 See in this paper, Khatibi´s and Arkoun´s discussions of the following 
notions: ideological adaptation of metaphysical concepts, and the polemical 
aspects of the Islamic discourses respectively. As indicated in note 7 (supra), 
Khatibi´s discussion of Freud´s psychoanalysis is not intended as an 
islamicising project.   
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“lies”13, the norms (methodology) and boundaries (subject matter) 
that are paradoxically agreed upon. It goes without saying that native 
intellectuals and religious scholars - clerics - are not and have never 
been a homogenous group. In the same vein, we know that Arab-
Islamic thought has never been exclusively religious or the sole 
property of a particular group. This is not a question of genre, but 
rather a question of discourses and representations, their conflictual 
relations, and their social and political agency.  
The narrativisation of Arab-Islamic modern thought takes its cue 
from a Eurocentric narrative of Western Modernity being 
universalised in a double violent act - Bonaparte´s invasion of Egypt 
in 1798. Bonaparte came to Egypt with an army of soldiers and men 
of learning. The Arab Orient became an object of military, economic 
and political subjugation, and an object of study (hence Orientalism as 
a discourse on the Orient). This historical event is mythologized as the 
beginning and catalyser of modern Arab-Islamic thought. A new 
chronology in evenemential historiography: a pre-modern and modern 
Arab-Islamic thought14. A “tailored” modernity began as process of a 
much less discussed dichotomy: the translatable and the 
untranslatable15. A new problematic was born: the term-pair aṣāla 
wal-muʿāṣara (authenticity and modernity). In fact, the term 
muʿāṣara denotes the idea of contemporaneity. That is being in the 
time lived as contemporaneity, and often is construed discursively as 
presence versus absence, a binary of opposition and hegemony: 
Western presence and Muslim absence; two opposing times, world 
views, discursive modes that are for ever essentialised and 
essentialising. Cultural differences, in these logicising discourses, are 
                                               
13 Bhabha speaks of this “lie” in the chapter “ Articulating the Archaic: 
Cultural difference and colonial nonsense” as follows: “ If a Muslim is 
coerced into speaking a Christian truth he denies the logic of his senses.... A 
part of like “folly” that is untranslatable, inexplicable, unknowable, yet 
repeatedly transmitted in the name of the native. What emerges in these lies 
that never speak the “whole” truth, come to be circulated from mouth to 
mouth, book to book, is the institutionalisation of a very specific discursive 
form of paranoia.” (Bhabha, 2004:197).      
14 Worth mentioning that the attempt to project European history on Arab-
Islamic history in the name of historicity has utterly failed. Besides 
positivism, classical Marxism - or the Eurocentric reading of Marxism and 
their proponents in the Arab world- has seen the universalization of 
Capitalism as a necessary and an unavoidable historical phase. Once again the 
colonial discourse has been reproduced - auto-orientalism or domestic 
orientalism! As we know now that capitalism has not been universalised in 
the Arab World, but rather a new division of worlds another different 
relations of production.    
15  For instance, Samah Selim, in her discussion of the politics of translation 
in Egypt in the 19th 1nd 20th centuries distinguishes between “authorised 
version of texts, which is tied up with power” and free zone (unauthorized) 
version of texts (detective novel or what one calls popular literature); a genre-
based translation according to which one finds formal (state sponsored) and 
informal (individual) translations. The latter, “unlike scientific ones, were not 
funded and organized by the state, but were instead “clandestine, meandering, 
and quite mischievous.” (mlynxqualey, 2015:1). Cf. Selim, 2010)  
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enunciated in terms of power politics: dialectics of permanent 
negation; a sort of theology of election, according to which only one 
group, the detainer of the absolute truth will be saved16. The 
emergence of modern Islamic Studies, inter alia, was conceived 
within this socio-political frame of asymmetrical power-relations. It 
is, therefore, of an utmost importance that we recognise this fact, 
obvious to all who wants to see it: the one, who does or should deal 
with this body of knowledge, does not escape these conditions of 
“birth”, the consequence of which represented and articulated in three 
kinds of discourses: Islamic, Orientalist, and Critical. While the first 
two represent two sides of the same coin: essentialising discourse that 
reproduce and sustain a structural separation between what is Islamic 
and what is Western, the latter, notwithstanding, tends to follow 
conceptually and methodologically the rules of the epistemological 
critique in an enunciation of negotiation - not negation; a site of 
hybridity.        
In this paper, I intend to focus on the Khatibi's double critique as 
a reflexive theory and praxis of decolonisation, desacralisation and a 
labour of incessant de-essentialisation of all sorts of affiliations, 
“targeting both a Eurocentric or Orientalist discourse and an 
ethnocentric local discourse.” (Rhouni, 2008:47) In the last part of 
this paper, I shall direct my gaze  - that of an accomplice - to Khatibi's 
notion of Muḥammad as the orphan book through an embroidering 
and embroidered17double reading - his and mine, reading and re-
reading as thought-other18 - of Freud's enunciation on “Islam” as an 
                                               
16 This theology of the elected one has been crystallized by the dogmatic 
reason which characterises the religious discourse: Jewish, Christian, Muslim 
etc.   
17 Here, we are presented for and in the presence of a critical concept. Before 
its conceptualisation as such, it used to be– and still is – a metaphorisation of 
the bilingual: Arabic-Hebrew in Judaeo-Moroccan poetry. A minority 
discourse on ”being together as difference” and “in space architecture and 
language, which the term ṭ.r.z. ( passive participle: maṭrūz: embroidered) in 
both Arabic and Moroccan lexicographies convey. The idea of painstakingly 
making something – a cloth, building, morals, and utterance – looks 
differently beautiful is inherent in the term maṭrūz: embroidered. For 
instance, embroidering a cloth by sewing patterns on it with thread transforms 
the cloth into something else: handkerchief, dress, etc. I have conceptualized 
this term as a critical liminality in my work on Sami Shalom Chetrit´s 
political poetry and Maṭrūz identity. (Sabih, 2009).       
18 What does reading, re-reading as thought-other mean? Khatibi presents this 
double reading in his article “La Sexualité selon le Coran” (Sexuality 
according the Qur´an) in which he sets his reading as a reading of another 
reading or reading of another´s reading. Here, he refers to his reading of the 
Qur’ān and his reading of Arkoun´s reading of the Qur´an. Khatibi´s reading 
consists of two distinct reading events: 
 
1. Reading as a suspension of “the immense archive of glosses and 
exegesis on and from the Qur´an.” In order words Khatibi wants to read 
the Qur’ān apart from the prophet´s Ḥadīṯ or the Bible. Suspension in 
the act of reading does not imply its rejection or its negation. He 
chooses the ”Qurʾānic perspective in itself with regard to the issue of 
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"abbreviated repetition" and an "imitation" of Jewish religion.  
Reading Khatibi is not an easy task. Every single word throws its 
reader to a hierarchy of genres, references, times, places, theories and 
languages. For this reason, I need to map once again a typology of 
various literary systems and their relational interdependence in order 
for the reader to understand where this double critique stands.  
To sum up, one notices two prominent discourses: 1) a mimetic: 
which “mimics methods, conceptual devices, modes of composition 
and argumentation of Western scientific discourse and its logo-
centrism into a kind of auto-orientalist discourse that reproduces the 
same binary oppositions and their inter-negating relations: 
Orient/West, religion/scientificity, pre-modern/modern etc., 2) a bi-
directional critical liminality that moves from and into the margin. In 
this movement, it de-centres all centres and itself, that the very idea of 
centrism. This theory of double critique, which contains the notion of 
mise en crise (putting into crisis /challenging), is often forgotten. 
Critique as putting in crisis both itself and the object under its 
scrutiny. In this sense too, critique is double:  critique of its intrinsic 
law and of societal law." (Khatibi 1981:319)19 
The difference between the two can be demonstrated, for 
instance, in how Taha Hussein´s and Khatibi´s critical approaches to 
the Qurʾān. Both were attentive to the theoretical and methodological 
challenges that the critical intellectual in a modern setting were 
facing. The result: two positions/discourses: a mimetic reading20 and 
double critique reading, a pensée-autre. To illustrate the latter point 
further - and in conjunction with our main topic - the Qurʾānic text 
has become - sometimes inadvertently - for a great number of 
                                                                                            
sexuality – not sex – without any reference – or seldom – to other 
monotheistic texts.” (Khatibi, 2002:241). Suspension of Ḥadīṯ  - in 
double-crtique reading of the Qur’ān - is a deconstruction of the very 
concept of sacralisation of meaning as self-generating - latent in 
Orthodoxy´s epistemology, and a suspension of the biblical debt”: The 
Bible is imagined as orgin and the Qur’ān as a borrower/borrowing.  
2. Reading as actualisation of other critical readings, as for instance 
Arkoun´s reading, according to which ”a programme of reading consists 
of three moments: a) a linguistic moment that will allow for a descovery 
of the covert order beneath the fragmented overt structure; b) an 
anthropoligical moment which will consist in recognsing the language 
of the mythical structure in the Qur´an; and c) a historical content in 
which the impact and limitations of logico-lexicographic exegeses and 
imaginative exegeses that Muslims have attemped so far will be 
defined.” (ibid.) (Cf. Arkoun 1970, 2001).  
19 “ L´idée souvent oubliée d'une mise en crise. La critique comme mise en 
crise á la fois d'elle même et de l'objet dont elle s'occupe...En ce sens aussi, la 
critique est double: critique de sa loi intrinsèque, et celle de la loi sociétale.” 
(Khatibi, 2002: 319). This text was first published in 1981, and later in 2002. 
20 The same applies to al-Jābirī’s comprehensive reading (commentary) of the 
Qur´ān. He was the only modern critical thinker and philosopher who has 
produced a four-volumes tafsīr, in which he tried to reconstruct the 
”historicity” of the Qur’ān as tanzīl, lost in classical exegesis of the Qur’ān as 
muṣḥaf (codified Qur’ānic text).  
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contemporary Arab thinkers an existentialist question, a 
hermeneutical battlefield on which these intellectuals have been 
trying to recover the Qurʾān from its self-imposing custodians - 
religious clerics - and restore it back to what it is - a palimpsest and an 
origin-less translation, a polyphonic text accessible by and to all.  The 
common concern - besides ideology and politics - for these committed 
intellectuals is, primarily, issues of epistemology, methodology, and 
identity. In the book fī al-šiʿr al-jāhilī (about jāhilī poetry)21 - if one 
should choose a beginning among many beginnings22 - the Egyptian, 
saint Simonian and Descartian positivist, Taha Hussein called upon 
Arabs to set aside their emotional bias and engage, instead, in a 
critical study of their literary and religious heritage - (al-šiʿr al-jāhilī). 
He meant that Arabs should do it as if they were strangers 
(occidentals)23. (Hussein, 1926) The most vocal reactions – that have 
been accredited the privileged status of authenticity and 
representativeness ever since – were the reactionary voices of Muslim 
Orthodoxy24. These authenticity and representativeness should be 
reflected in epistemology, methodology and identity in opposition to 
                                               
21 Well! This is the crux of the matter. I am trying to avoid the term pre-
Islamic that has been standardised in modern scholarship. The main idea of 
Taha Hussein is that if one should find a text that could tell us anything 
trustworthy about Arab Jāhilī society, the Qur’ān would be the right one, not 
the so-called “pre-Islamic” poetry. My position is that the Qur’ān becomes a 
Jāhilī product, a frontierial text, and a discourse – a very significant one I 
must add - on this yet-to-be chartered Jāhilī society.    
22 Beginning does not mean origin, but simply an emerging. Or as Gil Anidjar 
has articulated it: “In the beginning, there was no beginning” (Anidjar, 2008: 
84). 
23 Urvoy considers Hussein as one of the precursors of modern Muslim 
critical thought. In my view, Urvoy´s remark about Taha Hussein´s call to 
approach Arab cultural heritage, as a foreigner/outsider did not had the 
attention it deserved (cf. Urvoy 2006:607). As a matter of fact, Hussein´s 
positivist reading of “pre-Islamic” poetry was a clear expression of a euro-
logo-centrism that considered western modernity as universal, and therefore 
should be emulated. Arab societies future was the West, not the orient. 
Hussein´s reading Arab-Islamic cultural heritage as a stranger means in fact 
as a westerner does; a wordplay on: ġarīb (stranger/foreigner/outsider) and 
ġarbī westerner): Hussein´s reading is, therefore, one-directional critique, 
whereas Khatibi´s conception of the outsider/stranger is that of professional: a 
double critique reading that decolonises, de-sacralises, and de-centralises all 
essentialising/essentialised thought.  
24  According to Gottfried Arnold (1666-1714): “L’orthodoxie ne peut pas 
être définie comme un dogme, mais résulte simplement de la situation 
privilégiée obtenue par des clercs en échange d’un soutien inconditionnel aux 
puissances politiques. Des lors on ne peut pas parler d´objectivation 
dogmatique d´un message religieux, d'un kérygme, mais seulement de 
l'organisation d'un système politique et clérical”, (Orthodoxy can not be 
defined as a dogma, but simply as the result of the privileged position 
achieved by the clerics in exchange for unconditional support for the political 
powers. Thenceforth we cannot speak of any dogmatic objectification of the 
religious message, a kerygma, but of an organization of a political system and 
clerical only.), (Meslin, 1973: 31). This Passage is also quoted in Sylvain Jean 
Gabriel SANCHEZ L’historiographie du priscillianisme (1559-2012) 
http://sjgsanchez.free.fr/historiogsanchez.pdf, pp.6-7  
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western scholarship: Islamic, epistemology, methodology and identity 
are essentialised by and through both Orientalism (for instance 
colonial discourse) and traditionalist islam, and later on through Neo-
Orientalism and a Political islam; both power discourses are policing 
this imagined borderline.     
Failing to see beyond the curse of confessional and cultural 
affiliations, and their ethnicisation and politicisation, worthy of 
biblical genealogy25, and how double critique actually destabilises all 
sorts of affiliations and de-sacralises all religions, mythical origins, 
John Erickson finds it bewildering that four thinkers26, among whom 
Khatibi, are serving not only two masters as it were: Muslim (Sunnī) 
faith system and Western culture, literature and thought, but also 
serving two binary systems at the same time: a faith system versus a 
secular system!! As expected27 he painted a portrait of what Khatibi 
would call Sartre shedding tears28:  
                                               
25 Ethnicisation and politicisation, in Western discourse, of the categories 
Muslim and Jew – which were primarily religious and theological categories - 
began in the period of the enlightenment during the Catholic Reconquista and 
the expulsion of Jews and Muslims of the Iberian Peninsula. (Cf. Anidjar, 
2003; 2008) 
26 The four postcolonial thinkers whose writings Erickson investigates are: 
Tahar ben Jelloun, Abdelkébir Khatibi (Morocco), Assia Djebar (Algeria), 
and Salman Rushdie (Indian subcontinent).   
27 The expression “as expected” is a deliberate invitation for trouble. It is une 
mise en crise of who-expects-what-from-whom? In anticipation, I was 
expecting Erickson to tell us exactly about his own pre-conceived 
expectation: these four Muslim thinkers were expected to be and behave as 
believers: How does a Muslim believer read in a Sisyphean manner his own 
system of faith through western lens (à la Prometheus)?  It is the destiny of 
Khatibi – as expected - to be in this Sisyphean state: trapped in being a 
Muslim believer, but he should leave (as expected) the critical work to 
Orientalism. What Erickson fails to see is that Khatibi is, epistemologically, 
challenging this notion of expected-of him to be and act as a believer, this 
curse of affiliation (estrangement) through double critique in order to unmask 
it as power discourse. Double Critique is not a western theory. It is not an 
Islamic theory either. It does not need to be. It is simply a theory and praxis of 
the transtextual that is constantly and insistently de-constructing all master 
narratives.    
28 On this Khatibian allegory, see please my forthcoming translation of 
Khatibi´s book: Vomito blanco: sionisme et la conscience malheureuse 
(Vomito Blanco: Zionism and the Unhappy Consciousness), specially the 
second chapter: « les larmes de Sartre » (Sartre´s tears): “Même Sartre - de 
coutume un dialecticien unique -  y perd la tête: le dialecticien s´improvise en 
taoïste, puisqu´il accepte les contraires au même temps, mais un mauvais 
taoïste, puisque cette contradiction interne á son system ne peut être proférée 
que dans un déchirement indépassable: c'est encore la conscience 
malheureuse qui fait Sartre verse ses larmes sans pouvoir les essuyer avec sa 
dialectique éblouie.” (Even Sartre - usually a unique dialectician - loses his 
tongue in all this: a dialectician who acts now as taoist. He accepts two 
opposing positions at the same time. Sartre is, however, a bad taoist, since he 
is unable to utter this contradiction - internal part of its system - unless it 
comes out as an unsurpassable rift: it is the unhappy consciousness that once 
again causes Sartre to shed his tears without being able to wipe them with his 
dazzled dialectics); Khatibi, 1974: 20-21 
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The writers I am about to study are, to varying degrees, believers 
in the Islamic (Sunnī) faith system, and draw willingly and 
strongly upon western culture, literature and thought. But in 
strikingly different ways, their writings refute or clash with 
certain of the strictures imposed in the name of Word, of the 
Qurʾān, the Sunna. (Erickson, 1998: 2) 
 
Instead of negation - in Erickson´s case mutual negation - through 
which essentialising discourses articulate cultural and identity 
difference, Khatibi proposes what Homi Bhabha calls 
negotiation/translation- not compromise29 . The notion of negotiation 
“ conveys a temporality that enables the post-colonial mind to 
articulate antagonistic or contradictory elements: a dialectics without 
the emergence of a teleological or transcendent History.” (Bhabha, 
2004: 37) At this juncture, the question is no longer whether the 
critical discourse, operating as double critique, should or should not 
re-iterate the discourses that it intends to examine, but rather it is a 
                                               
29 Compromise is what characterises every reformist paradigm. In Arabic the 
term used is tawfīq, an operative key concept that Arab critical thought have 
been deconstructing for ages now! In the classical period, several forms of 
reformist paradigm have seen the light: In law, al-Shafiʾī´s (d. 820) 
canonisation of uṣūl al-fiqh (Sunnī Jurisprudence) was a form of compromise 
between rational-bound approach and tradition-bound approach. In theology, 
Abu al-Hasan al-Ashʿarī´s (d. 936) canonisation of uṣūl al-dīn (Sunnī Creed) 
was seen as a compromise between the Muʿtazila  and ahl-Ḥadīṯ with regard 
to the issue of status od the Qur’ān (whether it was created [Muʿtazila ] or 
not-created [ahl-Ḥadīṯ ]). According to this paradigm, reform was seen as a 
religious duty on the one hand, and was articulated as a synthetic project of 
conflicting positions, literary systems (ideas, interpretations, ideologies etc.) 
on the other. The same happened in the great reform of Arabic language, 
which Baġdād school stood for: a compromise between Kūfa and Baṣra 
schools. In modern reformist paradigm, the term-pair al-ʾaṣāla wal-muʿāṣra, 
the history of which shows clearly that the term ʾaṣāla is paradoxical, both in 
terms of its use by opposing discourses, and in terms of its fossilised nature, 
similar to Arkoun calls the “dogmatic mind”. The latter is an imagined 
impenetrable fortress that characterizes every fundamentalist-like thought. 
The issue of al-ʾaṣāla wal-muʿāṣra has been dealt with differently, from 
different angles, in every Arab and Islamic society, and in different periods. 
Cf. Beleqziz, 2009) The problematic of al-ʾaṣāla wal-muʿāṣara in 
Arab/Islamic thought is exclusively Muslim or religious. It was the 
problematic to and from which all movements of thought had to relate: 
Muslims, Christians, and Jews. While Muslims and Christians have been 
investigated, Jewish role in Arab Nahḍa is still awaiting serious work. Cf. 
Behar´s and Benite´s outstanding work: Modern Middle Eastern Jewish 
Thought: Writings on Identity, Politics, and Culture 1983-1958. It shows how 
wanting are the current discourses on Nahḍa and Nahḍa agents. Let´s hear 
from one of these agents, an early Jewish feminist and the founder of the 
organization nahḍat al-nisāʾ from Lebanon: “ My sisters, God will not change 
a people until they change themselves (a quote from the Qur´an, Q. 13:11), 
and this applies to us, the women of the East … A woman - with all pride - is 
the essence of life and its joy, the poetry of beauty and perfection ...when we 
recite a poem by al-Ma`arri, al-Mutanabbi, or Abu Tammam al-Ta´i.” (Behar 
and Benite, 2013: Chap.10). This passage is from Esther Azhari Moyal´s (d. 
1948) address at the American College for Girls in Beirut.   
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question of form, meaning, and position that critical discourse 
bestows on them. Khatibi considers any call to reject the West an 
illusion for the simple reason that the West resides in “us” Arabs. The 
question of whether the West resides in “us”, Arabs, or not becomes a 
question of how and what sort of west resides in “us” Arabs, and what 
sort of “us” arabs: 
 
Know that the Arabs´ problem – in its extreme form – we 
believe, is a west, whose difference is difficult to deal with…if 
the west is in us - not as an absolute entity [metaphysical idea], 
but as a difference that we are able to compare to another 
difference. Khatibi, 2000:30 
  
When we change the vantage of point and remove any barriers that 
hinder the weaving movements30 of double critique, Erickson´s split 
identity - a west versus an east - is replaced by a hybrid site. The west 
resides in the Arab-subject not as an absolute difference, but as a 
comparable difference: The Arab-subject is a bilingual being31.       
Roussillon, a French sociologist of modern Arab societies, has 
tried, somehow, to penetrate unsuccessfully into the “fortress” of what 
Arkoun calls the “hermeneutical circle” inside which Khatibi resides, 
and upon its body he exercises his intimate gaze. Roussillon has 
proposed clôture réformiste (reformist enclosure)32 as a substitute 
notion to Arkoun´s “hermeneutical circle”. According to him reform 
in contemporary Islamic thought is a debate, rather than a doctrine33; 
                                               
30 The expression “weaving movements” recalls the imagery of the movement 
of the embroidering needle and the bilingual hand that inter-laces poetry. (See 
note 17)  
31 Bilingualism is not necessarily two languages, but a concept that denotes 
the deconstruction of the One. Every language is diglossic, says Khatibi: the 
spoken and the written. An interpretative discussion of this concept in relation 
to Khatibi´s concept of the orphan book can be found further down in of this 
paper.  
32 Unlike what the French term clôture (translated here as enclosure) denotes, 
Alain Roussillon suggests here “ un quelconque << enfermement >> de 
pensées ou de curiosités. Le recours á cette catégorie << clôture >> vise plutôt 
à saisir le principe de l´unité d'un débat, c'est-à-dire la façon dont, 
précisément, au-delà des divergences de posture, les différentes pensées en 
présence ont en commun de se situer par rapport à un certain nombre 
d´interrogations qui sont les même pour tous.” (Whatever  “confinement” of 
thoughts or curiosities.  (Using this category “enclosure” aims rather at 
grasping the principle of unity of a debate. That is the manner according to 
which - beyond any divergences of position, the different lines of thought 
present have in common: namely to approach a certain number of 
interrogations that are identical to them all.) Roussillon, 2005:12.  
33 One of the salient aspects of “reform as doctrine” in western religious 
reformation was the de-sacralisation of the Roman Catholic perception of the 
sacredness of the Bible (muqaddas). According to the latter any access to the 
Holy Bible was forbidden for the non-clergy. Reform, in the protestant 
reformation, meant de-sacralising this catholic perception by making the 
Bible available in non-Latin vernaculars. In other words, what was de-
sacralised by the protestant reformist was the Latin Bible canonised by the 
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a debate for everyone to pitch in, irrespective of intellectual reference 
or affiliation. From the 19th century onwards, reform (iṣlāḥ) has been 
debated within the term-pair al-ʾaṣāla wal-muʿāṣara (understood as 
either authenticity and modernity or authenticity or modernity). In the 
19th century these two terms had a mimetic reflections: two 
geographical locations and two civilizational models: East and West 
respectively. In his reformist enclosure, Roussillon failed to find a 
place for frontierial thinkers that exercise critical liminality. “He 
failed to find”, to put it mildly, is an expression of a methodological 
inability and epistemological myopia towards non-reformist 
paradigm. Khatibi - a professional outsider, is he a partaker of the 
reform debate? Is he its Judas? Or is he “Europe´s francophone, who 
has undressed it”?34   
Arkoun´s “hermeneutical conflict”, however, maps Islamic 
discourses and orientalist discourses in a triangular relation with and 
in opposition to scientific thought. In this triangular relation, the first 
two discourses are subjected to the scrutinising gaze of the critical 
mind: Where epistemology and ideology are “undressed” and made to 
stand naked. Arkoun confesses that ideology has often the upper hand 
in modern Arab-Islamic thought, even among some of the most vocal 
Arab intellectuals - as in the case of the Moroccan historian and 
philosopher Abdallah Laroui35 - due to the impact of the anti-colonial 
                                                                                            
only sacred church: heavenly Jerusalem. The History of the Bible in Arab-
Islamic Orient had a different story. The Bible has been translated into 
Aramaic, Syriac, Coptic… and Arabic – even before the Mohamed mission. 
The Qur’ān, however, has always been available to those who could read, 
even to non-Muslims: Jews and Christians. The metaphysics of the One: one 
God, One religion, one language common to monotheism is a mythic account 
of the issue of origin. The rich debate in classical islam, even in the Qur’ānic 
text - about the Qur’ān, its divine source, composition, versions, etc., is a 
clear witness to that effect. Nowadays, Muslim orthodoxy tries to prevent 
today's Muslims from having similar debates in public. The official Ulama 
use the argument that such debates would only lead to the perdition of the 
common people. In this regard see the interesting debate in post revolution 
Tunisia on “the Qur’ān between Revelation and Text” organised by Tn-
Médias and which TV-channel broadcasted in August 2011. http://vb.tafsīr 
.net/tafsir27981/#.VSZfDFy9uqw   
One thing should retain whenever we discuss the issue of reform in the Arab-
Islamic context is that from a stage as these lexicographicalised terms: tajdīd, 
ʾiṣlāḥ, ʾijtihād, ʾiḥyāʾ, ʾinbiʿāṯ (baʿṯ) indicate, reform has been internalized in 
the religious, the social, the political, cultural registers.  
34 The last question is inspired verbatim by Réda Bensmaïa´s title of his 
chapter: ”Exotopia or L´Europe mise à nu par ses francophones, même!”  
(Bensmaïa, 2010) 
35Arkoun refers to Laroui´s book L'Idéologie arabe contemporaine: essai 
critique, in which the term-pair al-ʾaṣāla wal-muʿāṣra was re-visited. The 
context of the Israeli-Arab war in June 1967 and the catastrophic defeat of the 
Arab Armies had a traumatic effect (passim note 26) that not only shattered 
Arab nationalism´s dreams, but also triggered a second awakening of what we 
call today: political islam and Salafism (in its combatant forms). This is the 
compromise (tawfīq) that Arkoun has been warning against: The triumph of 
both neo-orientalism and Muslim orthodoxy. See Khatibi´s three articles that 
we are going to deal with in this paper:  “L'orientalisme désoriente”, “ penser 
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climate, in which the critical mind has given concessions to 
nationalism and religion. Similar concessions had been made earlier 
to nationalism and religious fundamentalism and led to the failure of 
Nahda project. Concessions were, in fact, the result of colonialism and 
anti-colonial sentiments together that derailed the second generation 
of Nahḍa from its initial course:  
 
On the Muslim side, it should be noted, first of all, that if we 
neglect the alluring fundamentalist discourse that despite having 
a great mobilizing force, it is devoid of any scientific merit, the 
real animators of the debate are very few.36 (Arkoun, 1985:92) 
 
I have noticed, after many years of teaching Islamic and Jewish 
studies37, that contemporary Western and Muslim scholarship on 
Islamic Studies - Qurʾānic Studies, or Biblical Studies, hardly mention 
Khatibi and Benslama38, despite the fact that they have been 
prominent animators of critical debate about the need or “ a new 
language of theoretical critique” that constantly seeks to overcome the 
given grounds of opposition and open up a space of translation: a 
place of hybridity,”(Bhabha, 2004:37) a kind of liminal site. Khatibi 
in le chercheur critique gives another definition39 of the qualifier 
critique - as part and parcel of the new language of theoretical 
critique:  
 
First! Let’s deal with this problem of vocabulary, the term  
'critical´, before going any further. As we know, there is in this 
notion, the idea of putting in crisis (mise en crise) - which is 
                                                                                            
autre” and “décoloniser la sociologie”. Equally important is Khatibi´s critique 
of Laroui´s historicism which he describes as a theological artifice dressed in 
an ideological form.” (Khatibi 2002 103)   
36 Arkoun, 1985: 92:“Du côté musulman, il convient de noter, en premier lieu, 
que si l´on néglige le discours fondamentaliste doué d'une grande force 
mobilisatrice, mais dénué de pertinence scientifique, les animateurs du débat 
sont en nombre très réduit.”  
37 I remember vividly, since the event that I am relating here represents a 
turning point for many of my students, the first post-graduate class that I 
taught in Islamic Studies. The course was Islam in the 20th & 21st centuries. 
Everybody was expecting a course on fundamentalism, terrorism, but to their 
surprise I proposed the following topic: Modern Critical Thought in Arab-
Islamic Studies. Some of the students suffered under what I have called here 
the curse of affiliations: Was Arkoun a Muslim? That is a believer? To them 
he was not! Unintentionally, they were re-iterating the same accusations that 
Muslim orthodoxy has been raising against the free thinkers. Most of them 
they have learned how to de-construct the theologically based conception of 
the term muslim and islam. Some of those students were Muslims who proved 
to be promising scholars. Two of them are contributors in this special issue.   
38 I would like to draw the reader´s attention to two works of Benslama in 
particular: La psychanalyse à l´épreuve de l´islam. Paris: Flammarion 
translated into English by Robert Bononno, Psychoanalysis and the Challenge 
of Islam (2009), and la guerre des subjectivités en islam. Paris: Nouvelles 
Éditions Lignes. 
39 Passim note 18.  
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often forgotten. Critique means putting both itself and the object 
under investigation in crisis at the same time.40 (Khatibi, 
2002:319). 
 
Decolonising: thought-other  
 
Three of Khatibi´s articles - written in the period between 1976 to 
1981- are of special importance to us here, “ L´orientalisme 
désorienté”41(1976) “décolonisation de la sociologie”  (de-
                                               
40 “D'abord un problème de lexique, le mot <critique> avant d'aller plus loin, 
il y´a en le sait. dans cette notion, l´idée souvent oubliée d'une mise en crise. 
La critique comme mise en crise á la fois d'elle même et de l'objet dont elle 
s'occupe...En ce sens aussi, la critique est double: critique de sa loi 
intrinsèque, et celle de la loi sociétale.” Khatibi, A. Le chercheur critique, 
Chemins de traverse: essais de sociologie (Rabat: Université de Muḥammad 
V – Souissi 2002) 319. 
41 Khatibi, A. L´orientalisme dérioenté, in Abdelkébir Khatibi, Chemins de 
traverse: essais de sociologie (Rabat: Université de Muḥammad V –Souissi 
2002) p.74. This text was published under the title “Jacques Berque ou la 
saveur orientalé” (Jacques Berque or the oriental Flavour), in Les Temps 
Modernes (Paris: June 1976). It was published under the current title in 
Maghreb Pluriel (Paris: Denoël) 1983:113-145.  Khatibi warns his reader that 
his article on Berque does not imply directly that “Berque is a legitimate heir 
to the colonial ideology and to its sociologie musulmane under the protecting 
eye of the “saint” Collège de France.” As a matter of fact, Berque is 
considered a “theoretician” of de-colonisation. Khatibi´s analysis of Berque´s 
discourse on Arabs shows how Berque has invented “his arabs”, who comes 
“directly from metaphysics in the heideggerian sense of onto-theo-logy.” 
(Khatibi 2002: 71) Unlike Said’s work Orientalism, which is considered a 
seminal work in postcolonial studies, few people have actually paid attention 
to this work of Khatibi on French Orientalism in the Anglo-Saxon world of 
Academia. (Lionnet, 2011; Gronemann, 2009) Various reasons have been 
proposed as why such a universal thinker (theoretician, writer, philosopher, 
sociologist, poet, playwright, political activist, academician) have not been 
recognised!  As we know all of Khatibi´s works are authored in French. Apart 
from few works, almost all of his works have not been translated into English. 
On the issue of Maghrebin studies in French see Edward Burke III 
“Theorising the Histories of Colonialism and Nationalism in the Arab 
Maghreb” (Burke III, 2009: 17-34).  Daniel Martin Varisco´s omission of and 
silence about Khatibi´s work from his list of critiques by Muslim and Arab 
scholars before Said's Orientalism is very surprising, to say the least. In a 
recent e-mail addressed to me, Varisco wrote: “Joshua, Oxford wanted a 
minimum of non-English references, unfortunately. Thus many valuable 
references had to be left out.” It is even more surprising that someone like 
Hišām Ṣāliḥ ignores the seminal work of Khatibi on French Orientalism in an 
edited work in Arabic on Orientalism (Arkoun, 2011) al-ʾistišrāq bayna 
duʿātihi wa muʿāriḍīh (Orientalism between its proponents and opponents) 
which translates a number of  articles of both proponents and opponents of 
Orientalism.  He presents a narrative consisting of two moments which he 
calls: Anwar Abdel Malek´s moment: “L´Orientalisme en crise” (Orientalism 
in Crisis), in Diogéne 1963), and Said’s moment: Orientalism in 1978. One 
thing is sure is that Ṣāliḥ tries to define that something else (see the note 31) 
that causes the orientalist discourse to become more defensive and apologetic 
under the attacks of these new native intellectuals.  I am very glad to see the 
renewed interests that some postcolonial scholars in Khatibi´s works: Mahmut 
Mutman recognises this postcolonial gesture (in English language) that took 
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colonisation of sociology), and “pensée-autre (thought - other). The 
last two were published in 1981. In these seminal articles, Khatibi 
presents three critical concepts, constitutive of the theory of double 
critique, and operative in its critical language (bilingualism): 
orientalism, decolonisation and otherness. Prior to Edward Said's 
Orientalism (1978), Khatibi published in 1976 the article 
“L´orientalisme désoriente” (orientalism disorientates), and in which 
he dealt with French Orientalists: Louis Massignon (d. 1962) and 
Jacque Berque (d. 1995) and through their works he outlines three 
characteristics of (French) Orientalism on the one hand, and the aims 
of the orientalist discourse(s) or ideology at work42, on the other: 
 
1. Orientalism deep-rootedness in the soil of metaphysics: islam  
 and arabness, which, according to this approach, are defined as  
 “a theological transcendence and a hypostasised history,” and as  
 “a high spirituality parallel to a passionate sensuality”  
 respectively. (Khatibi, 2002: 72) 
2. Non-contradiction between positivism and spiritualism: “ a  
 binding unity between essentialism, positivism and metaphysics.  
 It is remarkable how Khatibi dissects the orientalist narrative on  
 its proper history and the illusion of the unity of its enunciation  
 on its object orient, arabs, islam. Using Heidegger's analysis of  
 the Techniques as a prerequisite for understanding the position  
 of Orientalism in social sciences, Khatibi unmasks the will to  
 dominate immanent in the Orientalist discourse: “the destiny of  
 the Technique is the same as the destiny of metaphysics, and  
 science presents itself as a supreme simulacrum (will-to-will) of  
 Western domination.” (Khatibi, 2002:74) Orientalism in this  
 vein continues its course, loyal to its metaphysical foundations,  
 as if Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Marx, Foucault, Derrida have  
 never existed or spoken. (Ibid) 
                                                                                            
place two years before Khatibi´s death in 2009: “As an alternative to 
Massignon, I follow Gayatri Spivak´s advice and offer the Moroccan 
psychoanalyst and writer Abdelkébir Khatibi´s fascinating reading of 
Muḥammad’s biography in his essay `frontiers´.”(Mutman, 2007:108. See 
also Mutmam, 2014.  Being a trans-textual thinker who weaves in and out of 
various schools of thought is evident from the “testimonies of debt” that for 
instance Roland Barthes´ and Jacques Derrida have “confessed” on paper: 
Barthes title ´“Ce que je dois à Khatibi” (What I owe to Khatibi) (Barthes, 
1997:121-123), and Derrida’s personal address: ”Cher Abdelkébir, vois-tu je 
me considère ici comme le plus franco-maghrebin de nous deux, et peut être 
le seul franco maghrebin.” (Dear Abdelkébir, I consider myself here as the 
most franco-maghrebian of us two, perhaps the only franco-maghrebian). 
(Derrida, 1996: 29) 
42 It should be borne in mind that the issue under scrutiny by “native” critical 
intellectual is not western scholars’ erudition, or their ethno-confessional 
affiliations, but rather something-else. This something-else reveals the 
following truth: solidarity in opposition: orientalism and fundamentalism as 
two opposing essentialisms are in solidarity as far as both study-object (islam) 
and the division of tasks are concerned.  
94 Journal of Islam Research, Vol. 9, Issue 1, pp. 79-108 
 
3. Orientalism in its various discursive forms: Christian, Idealist or  
 Rationalist, seems to be in” solidarity with humanism, in which  
 theological humanism finds its shelter,” after the scholastic god  
 in the 19th century withdrew from the western scene, giving up  
 his place to man as the subject of history.” (Ibid) The logical  
 conclusion that Khatibi draws from this withdrawal is that  
 Orientalism “recovers this scholastic God with (fr. chez) the  
 Arabs.” (Ibid), Orientalism´s “arabs”.    
 
Mapping Orientalism’s various discourses means according to Khatibi 
a kind of periodization that consists of two unequal moments within 
Orientalism itself.43 Transiting from one moment to another is marked 
by a break (fr. ébranlement):  
 
1. Classical orientalism: stretching from the 12th century to the  
 Second World War. This period-moment is marked by  
 philology, historiography and culturalism (ethnography).  
2. Post-World-War-II orientalism: This type of orientalism has   
 become, according Khatibi, inserted within the field of social  
 sciences. Although French Orientalism began to “open up for,  
 inter alia, structural analysis, semiology and Marxism, the trial  
 of this body of knowledge was done on the basis of  
 Orientalism´s metaphysical foundations.” (Khatibi, 2002:73) 
 
Khatibi attends attentively to the second period of Orientalism, 
specifically to French Orientalism, and, more precisely to this 
institutional Orientalism - College de France - represented in its two 
orientalists: Massignon and Berque. Two points about this 
institutional orientalist discourse about these two categories: islam 
and arabs should be retained here: 
Massignon´s eschatological discourse on islam, which he depicts as 
religion of faith, shall save the Abrahamic humanity after the failure 
of both Christianity and Judaism because “Christianity has deviated 
from the inaugural truth, and has forgotten its prophetic mission by 
                                               
43 Khatibi speaks of two periods, historically speaking, of Orientalism. This 
should not be conflated with any kind of typology or taxonomy of 
Orientalism, nor should we infer from Khatibi´s periodization any kind of 
Manichean definition: “good”/”bad” Orientalism. Khatibi´s choice of the 13th 
century as a point of departure finds its explanation in the fact that the first 
chairs of oriental languages began in the West in 1225 after the decision of 
council of Vienna. The term “orientalist”, however, appeared at the end of the 
18th century.  One finds an echo of this discussion about Western Islamic and 
Arabic Studies in an intra-orientalist discussion, to which Rodinson makes 
allusion, a kind of discourse on discourse. Rodinson’s historicizing approach 
to the phenomenon of orientalism - dialectic of historical reality and thought - 
renders him a proponent of a discourse on methodology against other 
discourses within orientalism. Rodinson Marxist theory on orientalism has 
contributed to a taxonomy – hierarchized typology) of various orientalists 
discourses. (Rodinson, 1974) 
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covering over the colonialist crime. Judaism has been misled by 
Zionism.” (Khatibi, 2002:74). Khatibi concludes that “Massignon´s 
Abrahamic Allāh maintains the speech of the humble and the 
dominated,” (Ibid) and for that reason, Massignon proposes “his grand 
reconciliation of the three religions” (Ibid).  
The task of double critique transcends all sorts of essentialising 
polemics and engage through critical language - and as such it is 
always bilingual44 - an act of de-colonisation / re-appropriation- 
which should not be mistaken for negation (as I have mentioned 
earlier), or a revival of a repressed authenticity; a lost book, but rather 
as an act of negotiation which consists of:  
 
1. “A deconstruction of logo-centrism and ethnocentrism. That is  
 “a need to ponder on the structural solidarity between  
 imperialism in all its forms and the expansion of social  
 sciences.” (Ibid) 
2. “A necessary critique of knowledge and discourses that various  
 societies of the Arab world have elaborated on themselves.”   
 (Ibid) 
 
Exercising double critique relentlessly means a) unveiling the impact 
of producing a body of knowledge on the world (Orient) by social 
sciences that is conceived and developed in the West at the very 
moment the latter is exercising its imperialist hegemony on the world 
through the expansion of industry, and b) unmasking the sites wherein 
contemporary Arab knowledge “need to radically break with its 
theological and theocratic foundations that mark the ideology of islam 
and of all monotheisms.” (Ibid). The task at hand is “to localise the 
sites where a such knowledge is an ideological adaptation of 
metaphysical concepts.” (Ibid)! Remarkably, Khatibi does not exempt 
                                               
44  Khatibi asks this pertinent question vis-à-vis the dichotomy West/East, and 
which defines his notion of bilingual identity: “Shall we reject Europe and 
distance ourselves from it for good? Wouldn't that be an illusion, for the 
simple reason that Europe resides in us? Know that the Arab´s problem – in 
its extreme form – we believe, is a west, whose difference is difficult to deal 
with … if the west is in us- not as an absolute entity [metaphysical idea], but 
as a difference that we are able to compare to another difference.” (Khatibi 
2000: 30. In his second auto-biography, Khatibi speaks of the `self´ as a mask 
of `alterity´: “On the way to ourselves [us], we may say: I or: me, I, if one is 
in the state of listening to one´s subconscious. The self is neither hateful nor 
adorable. It is a unique mask of alterity” (Khatibi, 2008:8). Khatibi uses also 
the term of bilingualism to describe the dynamic character of identity. In post-
colonial theory, similar concepts have been proposed for the non-essentialist 
view of identity such as hybridity (Bhabha), mapping (Deleuze & Guattari), 
mestizaje [crossbreeding] (Anazaldua), interstitially and hyphenation (Misha), 
critical identities (Král). Today, it is difficult to “apprehend identity 
independently of identity construction and the mechanisms it involves” (Král, 
2009: 2). 
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Arab Marxist45 sociology from playing, as it were, this game of 
ideological adaptation. Where does this radically breaking leave 
contemporary Arab knowledge then? Does it necessarily mean that it 
ceases to be being Arab-Islamic? Or does it mean that once it breaks 
away (from whatever and wherever it is imagined to be belonging to) 
it becomes Western46? No! It simply means that the structure of 
contemporary Arab thought experiences “ a conflictual interference of 
two different types of episteme: The Western episteme covers the 
other.”  Furthermore, and in order to understand fully the position that 
contemporary Arab-Islamic thought is in a state of subordination to 
the Western thought - Khatibi goes beyond what traditionally is 
articulated in the dichotomy of a ‘West’ versus an ‘Orient’. Double 
critique entails opposing to Western episteme its unthought of/ its 
outside (fr. dehors) while radicalising the margin, “not only in thought 
in Arabic, but in thought-other which speaks in languages, and 
listening to all thoughts irrespective from where they comes from,” 
(Ibid) Maṭrūz Thought. 
In light of what Khatibi calls pensée-autre (thought - other) that 
speaks and listen to all thoughts, double critique breaks away from all 
sorts of foundationalist discourses: Salafi, Liberal, classical Marxism, 
reformist etc. since they are still trapped within or moulded by the 
theological and theocratic foundations on the one hand, and the 
ideological adaptation of metaphysical concepts on the other.   
    
 
Freud and the question of origin  
 
Asking the question about the origin of islam does not escape a 
historiography of the vantage point and how this origin is imagined. 
Needless to go through all the polemics around this imagined origin, 
but instead we would like to be a bit more attentive to how this 
question of origin being re-casted by Khatibi. Re-casted means, here, 
how Khatibi re-iterates the question of origin through a dialogue with 
Freud´s psychoanalytical enunciation, which Benslama describes as 
“an incident remark.” (Benslama, 2002:117):  
 
                                               
45 ”C´est pourqoui cette pensée-autre dont nous réclamons n´est ni marxiste 
dans le sens strict, ni antimarxiste dans le sens droitier de ce terme, mais aux 
limites de ses possibilités. Car nous voulons décentrer en nous le savoir 
occidental, nous dé-centrer par rapport à ce centre.” (This is why this thought-
other which we claim is neither Marxist in the narrow sense, nor anti-Marxist 
in the right-wing sense of the term, but the limits of its possibilities. It is 
because we want to de-centre in us the Western knowledge, and de-centre 
ourselves in relation to this centre” (Khatibi 2002 117). 
46 Laroui in his conclusion, which is in my view, could be interpreted as is in 
line with the very essence of what double critique does - applies to refusing 
Arab Culture as well: “The refusal of Western culture does not in itself 
constitute a culture, and the delirious roaming around the lost self shall never 
stir it up from dust” (Laroui, 1967). 
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I regretfully have to admit that I cannot give more than one 
sample that I have not the expert knowledge necessary to 
complete the investigation. This limited knowledge will allow 
me perhaps to add that the founding of the Muḥammadan 
religion seems to me to be an abbreviated repetition (abgekürzte 
Wiederholung) of the Jewish one, in imitation (Nachahmung) of 
which it made its appearance. There is reason to believe that the 
Prophet originally intended to accept the Jewish religion in full 
for himself and his people. The regaining (wiedergewinnung) of 
the one great primeval Father (urvater) produced in the Arabs an 
extraordinary advance in self confidence which led them to great 
worldly success, but which, it is true, exhausted itself in these. 
Allah proved himself to be much more grateful to his chosen 
people than Jahve had in his time. The inner development of the 
new religion, however, soon came to a standstill, perhaps 
because it lacked the profundity, which in Jewish religion 
resulted from the murder of its founder. (Freud, 1939: 148-149) 
 
Khatibi´s reading of this passage takes different focal positions in an 
untiring bi-directional movement: reading of Freud, Derrida, 
Muḥammad´s biography, and Islamic tradition. His aim is to “carry on 
from where Freud left off in the analysis of monotheism” - not in the 
sense of an ideological adaptation of metaphysical concepts. He 
crosses, however, the border and back again. He keeps doing this all 
the time, several times. It is his profession. He puts into question 
(mise en crise) a theory - his own - to deconstruct the orientalist 
discourse latent in Freud´s enunciation, and in doing so, double 
critique re-appropriates – neither mimesis nor repetition of - Freud´s 
theory of religion and its critical language: its limitations and silence 
in Freud´s psychoanalysis on islam or in the words of Khatibi “islam 
is an empty space in the theory of psychoanalysis.”(Khatibi, 2009: 
689–696)  
Fethi Benslama47, a lacanian psychoanalyst, takes also this short 
Freudian passage - the only passage 48- on islam or rather the issues of 
                                               
47 Fethi Benslama is a Franco-Tunisian psychoanalyst and an engaged 
intellectual. Together with Khatibi, they led a research programme: “raison 
and un-reason in Islam” un programme de recherche intitulé « Raison et 
déraison en islam ». 
48 Worth mentioning, the Freud mentions the Arabs in another passage Moses 
and Monotheism. on the origin of the israelite Jewish god Jahve he quotes 
Eduard Meyer Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme: Alttestamentliche 
Untersuchungen (Halle: Verlag von Max Niemeyer 1906) pp. 60-71, saying: 
“The second fact, proved by E. Meyer, is that these Jews on their return from 
Egypt united with tribes nearly related to them, in the country bordering on 
Palestine, the Sinai peninsula and Arabia, and that there, in a fertile spot 
called Qades, they accepted under the influence of the Arabian Midianites a 
new religion, the worship of the volcano God Jahve.” Moses and 
Monotheism, p. 98. Cf. Meyer E.  Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme: 
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origin of islam and in islam, especially its constitutive text the Qurʾān, 
and the fiction of Abraham/Ishmael genealogy; the figure of the father 
in Biblical and Qurʾānic archives49.  Both Khatibi and Benslama 
recognise, as I do, the temporality of Freud´s theory - as it is 
enunciated under the subheading of difficulties. It is not a declaration 
of non-jurisdiction, but of a reading of his days´ orientalist imagined 
islam as an imitation of Judaism50 - which we today see its limitations 
- and a displacement of that body of knowledge: a new theory of 
religion with regard to the central position of the urvater and its 
appropriation and translation in islam. Khatibi accepts, as it were, 
Freud´s text of islam as an invitation – from a professional outsider to 
another, of scrutiny of the pre-second world war´s Western body of 
knowledge on islam and the Orient. Now let us see how Khatibi re-
reads himself, his own exile, and displacement into Freud´s. Both of 
them are professional outsiders.51 Speaking of Freud, Khatibi reads 
him as thought-other: 
 
Freud then transforms this margin, this frontier, into a working 
laboratory. With this move, this professional outsider displaced 
the notion of an anthropological ground upon which individuals 
and their properties, peoples and their memory are inscribed. He 
displaced thought in displacing himself – this, in fact, is the task 
of the professional outsider. A professional outsider, separated 
from his mythical origin. Precisely like Moses. (Khatibi, 
2009:689) 
      
                                                                                            
Alttestamentliche Untersuchungen (Halle: Verlag von Max Niemeyer 1906) 
pp. 60-71.  
49 Beslama F. La Psychanalyse à l´épreuve de l´Islam (Paris: Flammarion 
2002).  
50 The term of day in those days - still in polemical literature - borrowing. 
Two hypotheses were advanced in orientalist discourse: the Jewish and/or the 
Christian origin of Islam. According Benslama “Freud quote was based on 
precise information gleaned from non-cited references.” On Jewish and 
Christian origin of Islam see for instance Abraham Geiger, Was hat 
Muḥammad aus dem Judenthume Aufgenommen? (Bonn: Gedruckt auf 
Kosten des Verfassers bei F. Baaden 1833); and Richard Bell, Origin of Islam 
in Its Christian Environment (Edinburgh: The Gunning Lectures Edinburgh 
University, 1925). The conclusion of these origin-fixed enunciations is that 
Islam has no proper origin.  
51 In his second autobiography Le Scribe et son Ombre (“The Scribe and his 
Shadow”), Khatibi describes this notion of “the professional outsider” in this 
way: “It happens that I introduce myself as Moroccan and as professional 
stranger …as the character of my last work said: 
`…He is a professional outsider´, he said 
`Funny trade! ´ 
`It is not a trade. It is a mobile position in the world. One is able to cross 
borders: between languages, civilisations and markets. One day, one stops to 
meditate. ´ 
`You are still there, Amigo! She said 
` Yes, Yes, always! When they look for me, they'll find on the road, the hand 
on my heart. ´” (Khatibi, 2008:15)   
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Now, how does Khatibi proceed? How in his exile - critical thought is 
always exilic - separates himself from his mythical origin52. 
Muḥammad - the prophet of islam in Islamic tradition - is “the orphan 
53of the book and the one who was not killed by his fellows and 
enemies”. Beyond the various accounts codified in Islamic tradition 
about Muḥammad's biography: birth, childhood, maturity, before and 
after Revelation, Khatibi distinguishes between Muḥammad of the 
“family romance” and Muḥammad - the prophet - the orphan of the 
book. Muḥammad in “family romance”: childhood is characterized, in 
Freudian terms, by substitution and duplication. Muḥammad’s lost 
father - Abdullah - is substituted by his grandfather - ʿAbdul Muṭṭalib 
- and Halima (wet nurse) is his mother´s - Amina - duplicate, whereas 
Muḥammad the prophet whose prophecy is “of orphanage of the lost 
book54 through which the prophet sacrifices his signature.”(Ibid.691) 
Interestingly, Revelation and its modi, as reported by 
Muḥammad´s biographers are read as “Ordeal of the Book and its 
script.” Revelation´s modi and states: “dreaming”, “while awake”, and 
“form and figure of an apparition” - that of the Angel that “speaks.” 
The order of the Angel to Muḥammad to ʾiqraʾ is understood 
according Khatibi as recite!55, that is “read[ing the message] without 
understanding it.” It is a di-phonic self-recitation: “reciting to himself 
through two separate voices that unite to convey the same message”. 
In a symmetrical and circular logic, Allāh as addressor is the “other 
voice of Muḥammad”, whereas the “initial addressee is the prophet.” 
What does it mean reciting/reading without understanding here? I 
would say, the question intentionally, goes beyond, without ignoring 
its polemical and erudite history and implications, the issue of 
Muḥammad “family romance”, and whether he knew how to read and 
write. It reformulates the question in terms of legibility and illegibility 
of the message. Muḥammad in this circular logic “occupies 
sometimes one place, sometimes another.”  The prophetic message - 
is illegible to him, since he inhabits it, but it is legible to his wife 
Ḫadīja: 
 
From the modesty of Gabriel to the reassuring gentleness of 
Khadija, the word took body. The wife deciphered certain signs 
                                               
52 Cf. Derrida, J. Abraham, l´autre, in Le dernier des Juifs, (Paris: Galilée 
2014) pp.69-126. 
53 Islam is an orphan religion in comparison with Freud´s description in 
Moses and Monotheism: “The Mosaic religion has been a father religion, and 
Christianity religion became a Son religion.” p. 141.  
54 The lost book that Khatibi refers to is to Freud´s “secret book”, which he 
mentioned in his correspondence with Arnold Zweig in 1939: “I am waiting 
for nothing other than Moses who has yet to appear as sure as night follows 
day, after which I shall no longer need to be interested in any book of mine 
until my next rebirth” (Khatibi, 2009:690). Khatibi´s notion of the lost book 
goes beyond the Bible of Freud. Cf. Derrida, 1995 
55 Q. 96:1. The verb ʾiqraʾ in imperative, translated here as recite!, has been a 
focal point for several interpretations.  
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of prophecy on her own body and on that of her husband. She 
read, in a way, on the imaginary body of Islām where, illegible to 
Mohammad himself, the prophetic message becomes 
apprehensible by the feminine body. (Burcu Yalim, 1988)56 
 
This is what Khatibi calls identification and separation. Muḥammad 
the prophet “identifies himself with the message and the Book57 that 
was written by No-one.” Separation, however, is “between the legible 
and the illegible, the voice and the writing, the visible and the 
invisible, between the white signature [that of Allāh] and the sacrifice 
of the name [that of Muḥammad], the survival and the transfiguration 
of the name.” The very notion of Revelation/revelation (waḥy) 
becomes in Khatibi´s reading a gesture of trespassing he impossible!  
Desacralizing the notion of Revelation that Khatibi undertakes here 
brings to the fore what Arkoun, in his diagnosis of the sacralising 
reading of the Qurʾān, the thing that has been kept out of sight. That is 
“the impossible-to-think-of “ since the 11th century: the notion of 
Revelation. (Arkoun, 2001:12) It is in this vein, that Khatibi calls 
upon Freud's gesture of desacralisation58 to undertake his own 
desacralizing of this impossible-to-think-of; “destabilisation of all 
notions of religion, of monotheism and of the Book.” (Khatibi, 
2009:690) Revelation in the case of Muḥammad the prophet becomes 
in his insertion in “a symbolic genealogy much richer than that of the 
                                               
56 Cited in Khatibi, 2009: 692  
57 On the notion of the book/Book: kitāb/al-kitāb in what traditionally is 
called western and Muslim Qur’ānic scholarship see (Madigan 2001). 
Interestingly, Madigan´s erudite presentation of the scholarly debate oscillates 
between modern western scholars and classical Muslim scholars. While 
maintaining both scholarships separate, Madigan re-iterates - mimically - the 
orientalist discourse on Islam as a modernist discourse on pre-modern object. 
The modern Muslim scholarship on Qur’ānic studies is “enunciated as non-
existent”. There is a huge epistemological and ideological difference between 
not mentioned and enunciated as non-existent.  Nevertheless, Madigan´s 
discussion of the notion of kitāb/al-kitāb, particularly Bell´s differentiation 
between the Qur’ānas document and the Qur’ān as a source is interesting. 
Regarding contemporary Arab-Islamic scholarship on the Qur’ān see for 
instance Nasr Abu Zayd, mafhūm al-naṣṣ (the meaning of the text), 
Muḥammad Arkoun: al-qurʾān: min al-tafsīr al-mawrūṯ ʾilā taḥlīl al-ḫiṭāb al-
dīnī ( The Qur´an: from the inherited exegesis to the analysis of the religious 
discourse), Tayyeb Tizini  al-naṣṣ al-qurʾānī  ʾamām ʾškāliyat al-binya wal-
qirāʾa ( the Qur’ānic text :the problematic of structure and reading), Ābed al-
Ğābrī’s four books: 1. an introduction:  madḫl ilā al-qurʾān al-karīm ( an 
introduction to the noble Qur’ān), 2. a tafsīr trilogy: fahm al-qurʾān al-ḥakīm: 
al-tafsīr al-wāḍiḥ ḥasab tartīb al-nuzūl (comprehending the wise Qur’ān: the 
clear commentary according to the order of revelation), Khatibi “sexualité 
selon le coran” (“sexuality according the Qur’ān”). This is not an exhaustive 
list, but few titles of a serious scholarship in the debate about the Qur’ānic 
text.    
58 Khatibi (2009:690) through the other demoralising gesture - an act of 
rationalisation, duplicates Freud´ enunciative I/he: “But instead of reconciling 
himself with his god, like the Oedipus of Sophocles, he destroys all divine 
illusions, all religious illusions, and treats them as a symptom of neurosis.” 
(Khatibi, 2009:690) 
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family romance.” (Ibid. 691) Reading this separation, these two 
genealogies, Muḥammad “reveals himself to himself, and to his 
relatives as the new new testament.” Khatibi construes revelation - 
prophetic message - as socially radical. Revealing himself to himself 
and to his relatives Muḥammad fought, adds Khatibi, against three 
figures: the seer (kāhin), the possessed (majnūn), and the poet 
(šāʿir)59. This three figures in Q 52:30 - as in the Qur´an´s re-iteration 
of the accusation that Muḥammad´s opponents - become social actants 
in this double gestures of revelation against whom the prophetic 
message is radical:  
 
The first belongs to a pagan genealogy and to its magic; the 
second, to its haunted margin and the third, to the act of tribal 
imagination. Mohammad destroys the pre-Islamic statues in 
order to appear to the world as the messenger (Rassoul) of ‘the 
One-Only’. (Khatibi, 2009: 691) 
 
How this business of Muḥammad being the orphan of the book should 
be taken? First Khatibi re-visits the concept of the palimpsest. Here 
Khatibi offers us two different relational mudi of texts: the 
palimpsestuous60 and the translational. It is a site - a frontier - 
                                               
59 Q. 52:30-31: “Therefore, continue to remind, for by the grace of your Lord, 
you are not a soothsayer, or madman, or do they say: A poet, we wait for him 
the evil of the time.” (Shakir´s translation), See also Q. 68:2; 81:22; 69:41-42. 
With regard to magicians and poets as antithesis to divine miracle and 
revelation see Q. 26.  
Benslama refers to the repudiated Hagar, mother of Ishmael as the first person 
to call the god who spoke to her and named the yet to be born child yišmāʿēl 
(Ishmael), now her god, as god-seeing-me ( heb. ʾēl roʾī ). By the same token 
she became the one who saw god as he saw her, even the well was called 
beʾēr laḥay roʾī  (the well of the living one who sees me)(Gen. 16:11-14). 
Benslama mentions also that Spinoza considered Hagar a prophet. We should 
bear in mind that Hagar is not mentioned in Qurʾānic archive. As for the 
biblical figure, the Midianite Jethro, one his three biblical names, a name of 
his profession as a priest (Ex.3:1, kohēn midyān): Ex. 2:18, reʿūʾēl (friend of 
god). In the Semitic “family romance”, the one that Freud uses, and which 
both Khatibi and Beslaman make reference to, the god (jahve) that the 
Israelite “borrowed” from the Midianites  (Ishmaelites/Arabs).  
On this very important point, Arkoun asks the following question: “Why does 
the issue of the attitude of the associationists (mušrikūn) vis-à-vis the 
phenomenon of revelation (waḥy) constitute one of the strategic domains that 
needs to be studied if the intention be founding a new and creative thought 
concerning the significance of religions and its meaning? Using the historical 
approach shall typify the query as an anthropological question vis-à-vis the 
emergence of the religious language and its function” (Arkoun 2001:93). 
Arkoun and Khatibi, as well as Benslama, were aware of the limitations of the 
historical investigation. Reducing the issue to historical-textual criticism 
alone - that is to description of the events, names, identities, literary sources, 
origins of ideas and their genealogy - will simply not do.  
60 On this term and history and various applications in Genette´s poetics see 
Gerald Prince´s “Foreword” to the English translation of Gérard Genette 
book: Palimpsest: Literature in the Second Degree (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press 1997), pp. IX-XI.    
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“between different messages of monotheism”.61 The One - unicity of 
Allāh and Arabic language - designates what Khatibi calls the 
“founding signature”62 of the orphan book “in the Islamic 
imaginary.63” In this frontier, a kind of pentecostal-like event takes 
place. This time, however, it is god who “changes language, the 
parabolic and the allegorical code,”64 in a hierarchy that stratifies the 
possible and the impossible. The possible: the game of palimpsest that 
presupposes “a book and its duplications, a testament which would be 
the origin with its copies.”65Khatibi does not deny its existence, but 
allocates to it a status and a set of functions: the oral, the written and 
symbolic levels - the inside. It is limited by the translational - trans-
cross-frontierial - “where the lost book is precisely of the impossible 
origin.66”It is the outside. Between the inside and the outside lies the 
question of borrowing. The origin, says Khatibi becomes the 
“mythical account of borrowings.”67 
In Jewish, Christian and Muslim narratives of abrogation - 
actually it is called the doctrine of abrogation - abrogation is 
postulated as retrospectively external, and circular-internally. It is a 
matter of law, continuity and discontinuity (negation). Khatibi calls 
this phenomenon cross-repression: Old Testament, New Testament, 
and Qur´an.  In order to deconstruct this narrative of election of the 
“saved community”, Khatibi through double critique, de-sacralises the 
mythical account of borrowing by depositing the following 
hypothesis: The lost book of monotheism is the split book: a Book 
without origin. Khatibi let Freud do the work first, and he carries on 
from where Freud stops. It is like writing with two hands. This is done 
through “a systematic reading of desacralisation”. When Khatibi says 
that Freud de-sacralises, he means that he rationalises. What does 
Freud´s decentralising /rationalising consist of? It is when Freud 
divides the One into two or multiple ones. For instance Freud deposits 
a narrative with three duplicates: 
 
1. Moses the Egyptian is killed in order for the mythical founder to  
 emerge.  
2. Christ who “would in fact be a murderer who disguised himself  
 in the angelic costume of a Redeemer, of a false victim.”68 
3. Muḥammadan religion the foundation of which “seems to be an  
 abbreviated repetition of the Jewish one, in imitation of which it  
 made its appearance.”  
                                               
61 Khatibi, 2009:692.  
62 Khatibi, ibid. 
63 Khatibi, ibid. 
64 Khatibi ibid.  
65 Khatibi ibid.  
66 Khatibi ibid. 
67 Khatibi ibid.  
68 Khatibi ibid  
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Regarding the third duplicate, Khatibi seems to be at work again. Why 
an abbreviated repetition? Khatibi´s measured answer is an expression 
of a calculated gesture that restrains from falling into narcissism of the 
victim – back to the curse of affiliations whether religious or 
nationalistic. An imitation? Yes, but one that “lacks the murder of the 
father, whose postulates is crucial to Freudian analysis”. Benslama 
sees in Freud´s “incident remark” an attempt to rethink origin and “a 
plurality of emergences and a resurgence of the same trace across 
time.” (Benslama, 2002:117)   
Khatibi´s hypothesis of Muḥammad as the orphan book of 
monotheism draws Muḥammad´s “family romance” in which he is an 
orphan, and on prophecy according to which Muḥammad sacrifices 
his signature. He has a book of his own. He is the Book: He recites 
himself to himself. Allāh has no signature; or rather his signature is 
white with no trace. Muḥammad was not killed by his people, or was 
he? Should he be killed in order for his mythical duplicate to arise, as 
was the case with Moses the Egyptian69? He sacrificed his signature, 
his book.  
As to the Freudian concepts of repetition, abbreviated repetition, 
and imitation Benslama offers other explanations.  Since repetition is 
“neither reproduction nor rumination,” what is it then? He presents 
two definitions / registers of this psychoanalytical phenomenon: 
 
1. On the symbolic level: the principle of language use dictates the 
same signs. In the case that the same produces new meanings, 
then one can conclude that repetition produces difference. 
2. On the level of what is impossible to symbolise: In the case for 
instance of traumatism, repetition serves as tool with which one 
controls trauma. “It is in this case a vain attempt to come in 
terms with the return of the same.” (Benslama, 2002:116) 
3. On the term imitation, Benslama recognises the fact Freud used 
it in conformity with the orientalist thesis about the Jewish origin 
of islam. The idea of imitation denotes in the orientalist archive, 
an unlawful takeover and a mimicry that hides fraud, whence the 
palimpsestuous concept of an origin and a copy. In the Qurʾān’s 
polemical discourse, returning Abraham is an act of Islām´s re-
founding its self as the true monotheism linking its origin with 
the sealing end.  
 
One should also consider the significance of Freud´s portrayal of 
Arabs ´double role (being a lender and a borrower): the Arabs lent 
their god Jahve to the Israelites at the time of Moses and being a 
borrower at the time of Muḥammad. In this cycle of borrowing and 
                                               
69 Derrida discusses the issue of whether Moses was threatened to be killed or 
was actually killed in the wilderness according to Bible and Midrash archives: 
Numbers 14:10. (Derrida, 1995:43-44). In Islamic biographies of Muḥammad, 
several attempts to kill Muḥammad were made by his people.   
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lending, one cannot speak of an origin, but of multiple emergences 
and resurgence of the same trace across time; in other words, origins.    
 In conclusion, Khatibi´s reading of Freud´s passage as a an 
exilic text on islam being “an abbreviated repetition” shows intimately 
how double critique re-creates its critical language by exposing it to 
an inside and an outside reading in a weaving movement. Does 
Khatibi try to psychoanalyse islam or islamicise psychoanalysis? A 
legitimate question I would say?  A question that perhaps only border 
police would ask: 
 
For precisely these reasons, it is not, as I understand it, a 
question of psychoanalysing islam, nor of islamicising 
psychoanalysis, even less of judaising or hinduising it, but of 
exercising it as frontierial position in the language and exercise 
of a profession. (Khatibi, 2009:696) 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper/essay, I have shown how a double critic thinks, works, 
and navigates through theories, bodies of knowledge in reflexive 
manner. Double critical thought enjoys an unprecedented openness. It 
gets its force from scientific rationally that is in action in a world of 
conflict and contradictions, challenging different strategic, economic, 
political, ideological, and cultural models.  
Khatibi´s double critique paradigm is a theory of theory (meta-
theory) and a bi-directional exercise; a theory of de-centering centres 
and an exercise of de-centering the self as centre. A general theory, as 
we have seen, concerning how Khatibi for instance postulates the 
issue of origin an epistemological question and as discourse of 
difference, of transtextuality and transition. The issue of origin, all 
origins are narratives as mythical accounts of borrowing, upon which 
double critique builds its own narrative of fictionality, archive and 
memory. For example De-centering the Qurʾānic accounts of the 
origin is first of all a de-sacralisation of any reading as centre reading, 
including its own.   
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